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ABSTRACT 
It is the scope of this project to analyse how the past and current economic conjuncture in 
Angola, mainly driven and characterized by the Dedollarization process that is undergoing, has 
been impacting the Angolan Baking Sector, one of the biggest pillars of the Angolan economic 
activity. 
Given the known data constraints, this project only focused on the analysis of the 
Dedollarization impact in one of Angola’s biggest banks: Banco de Fomento de Angola. 
The statistical approach consisted on two multi-factor regression models to analyse the impact 
on two different Key Performance Indicators of the bank: Return on Equity and Regulated 
Solvency Ratio. 
Although it was complicated to derive statistical significance for the two models, mainly due 
to a reduced number of observations and the quality of the model, the results converged to what 
a financial economics analysis led later on the final part of the project.   
The final remarks regarding the role of Dedollarization in the Banking sector, with a focus on 
BFA, are extremely eye-opening. Unlike what was thought à priori, the overall impact on 
BFA’s results is positive, mainly in the back of the high inflation environment that is being felt 
in Angola, which increases the spread of the assets’ returns in national currency versus in 
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Angola, a country that is widely known as a nation of extremes. In the capital, Luanda, one can 
easily find one of the nation’s richest men passing by one of the nation’s poorest men. With a 
weakly diversified GDP and still relying in close to 50% on Oil-related activities, the golden 
days of Angola have been putting to test during the last three years. 
Going through a process of Dedollarization since 2011 with the purpose of regaining flexibility 
on monetary and fiscal policies, BNA was able to reduce the Dollarization levels to historical 
minimums while maintaining a stable economy. 
However, with the crash on Oil Prices during 2014, Angola started to enter in a turbulent period, 
exposing a fragile Angolan economy alongside with a depreciating Kwanza. 
2.LITERATURE REVIEW 
Akcay et al. (1997) developed a method which showed that as the degree of currency 
substitution increases, the greater the volatility of the exchange rate. They conclude the study 
by showing that as there is an increment on the level of currency substitution, there is a required 
increase on the change of the exchange rate. 
Moreover, it is known that depending if the economy is free of black market regarding the 
exchange market and if the domestic money supply has a certain degree of flexibility, we can 
infer that in a partially dollarized economy there will be or not stability in the exchange rate. 
Mercedes García Escribano (2011) defined Dollarization empirically as a series based on a 
constant value of nominal exchange rate. 

































where ddt stands for Deposits Dollarization in a given moment of time t and ldt stands for Loan 
Dollarization in a given moment of time. lt
fx refers to the amount of loans in foreign currency 
at t. The same reasoning applies to dt
fx, with the exception that it refers to the total amount of 
Deposits in foreign currency but already converted into local currency. In this case, it will 
consist the amount of Deposits in USD converted in AKZ. SConstant refers to the nominal 
exchange rate where the analysis is based and that will be the reference point for all the other 
exchange rates in order to transform the Dollarization from nominal to real. Additionally, St 
refers to the nominal exchange rate at a given period t. By multiplying the dt
fx by the ratio 
SConstant
St
, the FCD (Foreign Currency Deposits) is adjusted, so that the Dollarization can correct 
for the exchange rate movements, which can cause big swings in the Dollarization ratios. 
By doing this extra step, the real amount of foreign currency that was in fact added or taken 
from the economy is what results from this approach. Otherwise, the swings and movements 
on the exchange rate that can occur without a single change on the FCD level would result in a 
biased analysis.  
García Escribano (2011) also highlights how the evolution of the dollarization levels from a 
period to another is achieved (if the variation is negative, then there is the presence of 
Dedollarization): 
𝑑𝑑𝑡 − 𝑑𝑑𝜏 =  ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑡
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Lastly, Mauro Mecagni et al. (2015) analysed the main differences and common factors 
between a group of successfully dedollarized countries and another group of unsuccessfully 
dedollarized countries. 
The main takebacks are that the successful countries outperformed the unsuccessful ones in the 
parameters of macroeconomic stability, higher levels of growth, enhanced fiscal balance and 
accounts and low levels of debt.  




an overall reduction of 14% on the inflation level, unchanged exchange rates and a reduction 
on public and external debt levels. 
3.DOLLARIZATION 
The process of Dollarization occurs when the local currency is substituted by a foreign 
currency, usually US Dollar, and adopts the forms of store of value, unit of account and means 
of payment. 
It consists in a measure that most under-developed countries apply when they are facing 
hyperinflation levels and a domestic currency depreciation, translating in economic instability. 
Countries where there is a high level of inflation, which creates a real exchange rate instability, 
tend to motivate residents to turn themselves to the foreign currency as it ensures a steadier 
purchasing power regarding domestic consumption. 
Dollarization ends up being perceived as a natural result of the progressive openness of the 
emerging countries’ economies to the global economy. Starting in the 80’s, several emerging 
economies went through Dollarization processes in the back of new exogenous shocks resulting 
from a bigger level of exposure of the economy. There are several examples where the process 
of Dollarization has been applied, especially in the emerging economies, namely: Russia in 
1998, Peru in mid-70s and in 1990, among several others. 
3.2 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DOLLARIZATION 
There are several advantages on dollarizing an economy: asset substitution when a government 
opens the economy and liberalizes the financial market, enhancement of the integration within 
the international markets and most of the times it has an important role in the development of 
domestic financial markets. Moreover, Dollarization mitigates the exchange rate risk for 
foreign investors, attracting more investments for the country and allowing for a diversification 




consumption and thus in economic growth, through a reduction on the cost of credit. 
Nevertheless, Dollarization also carries several disadvantages, like the limitation of a country’s 
monetary policy efficiency. It also implies that the country loses its seigniorage and has to pay 
it to the foreign currency issuer. Moreover, the country’s efficiency on the daily transactions 
and payments can be lost, since the central bank can no longer adapt their banknotes to the 
population’s needs. Other aspect to take into account is the fact that dollarized economies are 
highly exposed to the risk of occurring both a financial and currency crisis because of the lack 
of power and control over their monetary policy. Lastly, by dollarizing an economy, the 
liquidity risk will grow, meaning that small lenders only have access to unlimited funding in 
domestic currency, so, in the case of general panic and bank runs, BNA cannot supply 
unlimitedly the population with foreign currency, which can trigger a currency crisis.  
Concluding, one can see that there is always a different and optimal level of dollarization to be 
applied to a country, specially based on the economy’s size, openness, the degree of financial 
integration and market development. 
3.3 ANGOLA’S SITUATION WHEN DOLLARIZATION WAS INTRODUCED 
By late 1990’s, Angola was in a very difficult and unstable economic period. The country was 
suffering a sharp devaluation on their currency: Kwanza (AKZ) and the inflation was very high. 
This bad economic shape was in part due to the civil war that was taking place at this period. 
Since the purchasing power was dropping excessively in the eyes of the Angolan people, the 
role of USD started to grow exponentially and got strong as the Government started to induce 
the population to start using USD in order to stabilize the economy, i.e, inflation levels. 
Therefore, in 2001, the Government decided to start the process of Dollarization of the economy 
by applying several measures in order to counter attack the 241% inflation level that was being 
seen at the time. As a result of this introduction, the real GDP growth took off in 2003 when it 




In the case of Angola, the economy became partially dollarized, which implies a De facto 
Dollarization, as an individual could easily use AKZ or USD to make a domestic payment or 
transaction simultaneously. Additionally, by the fact that the overall banking system substituted 
their structures to USD, it was in fact, a Financial Dollarization. Moreover, the foreign currency, 
i.e. the USD, was used in domestic transactions, showing a characteristic of Transaction 
Dollarization. 
4.DEDOLLARIZATION  
As already stated in the Literature Review, macroeconomic stabilization and stable and low 
inflation are key ingredients for a successful dedollarization. 
4.1 ANGOLA’S SITUATION WHEN DEDOLLARIZATION WAS APPLIED 
During 2009, the majority of African countries were affected by the 2008 international crisis. 
Due to its GDP exposure to Oil prices, Angola suffered a bigger hit, but also was able to rebound 
quicker than the average, mainly because of the quick jump on Oil prices during the mid of 
2009. Angola continued to recover during the year of 2010 especially after the signature of 
Stand-by deals with the IMF, which gave a boost to the process of stabilizing the economy, 
namely the rebalancing of the Government accounts. The latter was a major happening for 
Angola to achieve a degree of credibility amongst the rest of the Sub-Saharan African 
economies. Furthermore, for this economic recovery, factors like the rebalancing of the 
Government budget in the Non-Oil Sectors and the initiative of public and private debt 
regularization, played a major role.  
Ultimately, in 2010 Angola was an economy that had re-gained the confidence of economic 
agents, registering an astonishing increase in foreign investments. 
Nevertheless, a Dollarization process also carries drawbacks and they were determinant in the 




by BNA’s analysis were the drop on Government’s liquidity because of the high share of 
Foreign currency assets and liabilities compared to the national currency levels; the inefficiency 
with payments in local currency; and the loss of control on the monetary policy of the Angolan 
central bank. Adding the drawbacks of Dollarization that BNA was starting to realize to the 
economy stability in terms of inflation and GDP growth, the decision of dedollarizing the 
Angolan economy was voted and put into practice.  
4.2 BNA’S MEASURES REGARDING DEDOLLARIZATION 
 
 
Figure 1 Source: BNA 
 
Figure 2 Source: BNA 
After the decision of Dedollarizing the Angolan economy, BNA started to implement several 
prudential measures. The willingness of the Angolan Central Bank to better the scenarios for 




closely the required level of reservoirs regarding the deposits. This influence was expected to 
reduce the financing costs of the economic agents in order to incentivize the use of Kwanzas. 
In terms of regulations sent out by BNA with the intention to promote a De-dollarizing process 
in the Angolan economy, there are five promulgations that are worth to mention.  
Chronologically, Aviso 5/2010 de 5 de Novembro – Exposição cambial was the first sizable 
regulation introduced in the Angolan banking system. This law limited the liquid cambial 
exposure (foreign currency assets minus foreign currency liabilities) to 20% of a regulated 
financial institution’s ROF (Regulated Own Funds). 
Secondly, Aviso 4/2011 de 8 de Junho – Crédito em moeda estrangeira, regulated the 
concession and classification of loans given by BNA-regulated financial institutions.  
They implemented a risk-grading system from A to G, starting in the riskless (A) and finishing 
in the loss level (G) and forbidden the following credit operations in foreign currency.  
Lastly, given the size and impact of Oil related investments and activities in Angola’s GDP, it 
became obvious the need to differentiate the cambial legislation concerning the Oil sector from 
the other economic activities. In this context, BNA published the Aviso 20/2012 de 25 de Abril 
– Regime Cambial Sector Petrolífero, the biggest step taken towards the Dedollarization 
process. It was designed to regulate the liquidation of equity and goods operations, and the cash 
flows resulting from R&D, development and production of crude oil and natural gas.  
5.THE BANKING SECTOR IN ANGOLA 
This research project is based in the Banking sector especially because it is a perfect benchmark 
for the country’s economic situation and performance. Angola has always had a significant 
Financial Services Sector, however it intensified largely in the early 2000s, with a market 
consolidation that today contemplates more than 30 Banking Institutions. Regarding the 
analysis of the Banking Sector, it consists in three main components: the profitability, solvency 












 Figure 3 Source: BNA and Bank’s Annual Reports                                              Figure 4 Source: BNA 
It was precisely during this period that the Dedollarization regulations started to show and 
applied, showing à priori some sort of causality. Additionally, Figure 4 shows the average ROE 
of all the Angolan Banking sector and how it has decreased throughout the period 2011-2015. 
It can be also noted that from the last year and half, the sector has been regaining confidence 
and strength. Nevertheless, a worrying aspect is the fact that the % of Non Performing Loans 
is presenting an upward trend, a risk that represents nowadays represents 15% of loss on Banks’ 
returns coming from Loans.  
                               Figure 5 Source: BNA                                                                Figure 6  Source: BNA 
Concerning the Solvency of the Angolan Banking Sector, the data presented in Figure 5 does 
not seem to stand any trend. The only aspect that stands out is that the ratio has been oscillating 
between 14% and 22%, showing a high level volatility which does not imply a bad level of 




to the Liquidity, Figure 6 is very enlightening in the sense that the Banking system is already 
assimilating a trend of more liquidity (less Loans), especially when the Non-Performing Loans 
is increasing, which translates in a loss in the medium term. This trend is mostly visible after 
January 2013 until June 2016. 
6.BANCO DE FOMENTO DE ANGOLA - BFA 
The fact that Angola has a data collection problem was determinant in the approach chosen for 
this project in two ways. On one hand, it meant that a study about the impact on all the major 
Angolan Banks would be literally impossible due to the inconsistency and lack of data, even 
on the annual reports. On the other hand, the choice of BFA was achieved as it was the 
institution that had a better control and records of their figures. Furthermore, besides the data 
implications, BFA was a clear winner at the time of choosing an institution as it is one of the 







Figure 7 Source: BFA Annual Reports 




analysed components: Regulated Solvency Ratio, ROE and Liquidity Ratio. What immediately 
stands out is the flat RSR, or at least, less volatile as the Banking sector average value. In fact, 






                
Figure 8 Source: BFA Annual Reports                            Figure 9 Source: BFA Annual Reports 
The same applies when examining the ROE, with BFA attaining a spread of 20% compared 
with the average of the Angolan Banking Sector. After the financial performance analysis is 
done, it is required an overlook on the topic to which we are trying to evaluate the existence of 
a relationship: Dollarization levels. The following Figure 10 shows the evolution of the both 
levels of Dollarization (Deposits and Loans) on the bank’s Balance sheet. The calculation of 
these ratios followed the same guidelines as García Escribano (2010) and BNA’s study, and 
therefore were adjusted for the Exchange rate (𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 2010, in order to mirror the moment 
right before the introduction of regulatory measures). 
 




Following the same path as the Dollarization in the Angolan economy, BFA’s levels have 
registered a downward trend in both Deposits and Loans. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
explore the type of impact that the Dedollarization had in the bank’s balance sheet, if it 
pressured the transfer of Assets and Liabilities from Foreign currency to national currency or if 
it had an impact and fomented the growth in both Loans and Deposits. Figure 11 represents 
BFA’s Balance sheet evolution by assets and liabilities, showing that Deposits grew more than 
100% since mid 2010. Furthermore, the total amount of Loans astonishingly jumped between 
2013 and 2014 which is a very curious fact as by then it had already been released the regulation 






         
       Figure 11  Source: BFA Annual Reports                                               Figure 12  Source: BFA Annual Reports 
Analysing a breakdown of the Loans evolution in FCL and DCL, it is perceived on Figure 12 
that in fact during 2013 and 2014 there was an increase in the component of FCL. After a careful 
examination on the annual reports of those years it was finally discovered that these two jumps 
were due to two loans to the Angolan government, with a global value close to $300 millions, 
who is not included in the previously stated regulation. 
7.METHODOLOGY 
After carefully researching the several ratios that can truly show us how healthy an institution 
is, it was defined a bundle of three that are crucial to analyse a bank’s health: Solvency, 




the Solvency and Profitability components, i.e. the Regulated Solvency Ratio and ROE. The 
Regulated Solvency Ratio was chosen as it was the only explained variable with an acceptable 
sample of 68 observations.  
7.1.Regulated Solvency Ratio: RSR 
𝑹𝑺𝑹 =  (
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑶𝒘𝒏 𝑭𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 − 𝑾𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔
) ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
Regulated Own Funds, corresponds to the sum of Capital Tier 1 and Capital Tier 2. 
Risk-Weighted Assets, concerns the value of the assets exposed to credit risk weighted by their 
own risks. 
Capital Tier 1, is translated in the difference between two components. The first corresponds 
to the sum of the Net Income generated in the current period, the transitioned results from 
previous years, legal reserves and equity. The second component is the sum of loans, 
participations values and other intangible assets. 





As already outlined, the purpose of this project is to analyse the influence or impact that 
Dedollarization has on BFA’s shape. Besides Solvency, one of the most important KPIs and 
benchmarks for a bank’s success and profitability, is the Return on Equity. This ratio is essential 
to figure out the efficiency and quality of the profits being generated, therefore by analysing 
the impact of Dedollarization on this ratio, will be a good way of reaching our goal. 
7.3.Variables Choice 
As already mentioned, in order to test for an impact of De-dollarization in BFA’s health, the 
best variables to represent the bank’s shape were defined as the Regulated Solvency Ratio 
(RSR) and Return on Equity (ROE). 




in these BFA’s KPIs, this approach will also try to analyse exogenous variables to the bank, as 
they are also being affected by the Dedollarization process at some extent.  
Therefore, I divided the explanatory variables in three main groups: BFA-related variables, 
macroeconomic variables and prudential measures variables. Concerning the BFA-related 
variables, I chose BFA’s Loans (LD) and Deposits Dollarization (DD) Levels as two predictors 
for the Dedollarization level. As we know, a decrease in the Dollarization ratio represents an 
increase in the Dedollarization of the economy. When it comes to the Macroeconomic variables, 
I opted to include five different variables so that they could mirror the Angolan’s economy 
performance at a given period. Thus, I decided to use: Exchange Rate (EX), as it reflects the 
appreciation (Dedollarization) or not of the Kwanza and impacts the Bank’s results and 
solvability; Inflation (INF), in order to assess the direct relation that it has on the bank, as its 
increase puts a pressure on BFA clients’ Kwanzas Deposits; Oil Prices (OIL), which was an 
external event that brought a massive shock to the Angolan GDP, therefore having an impact 
on the banking sector; Exchange Rate Spread (EX_SPREAD), so that I am able to see whether 
the credibility and trust that the Angolans affects BFA; and finally, 3 month Angolan Treasury 
Bills (BT) which will work as a benchmark of Angola’s risk evolution. Lastly, regarding the 
prudential measures variables, instead of creating dummy variables in order to incorporate the 
three main regulations that BNA launched towards a Dedollarization process, I decided to come 
up with endogenous variables that work as proxies to the effects of these measures, namely: 
Foreign Currency Loans Level (FCL), which refers to the Aviso 4/2011 de 8 de Junho, which 
stated that financial institutions would no longer be able to concede loans in USD to their 
clients; and Domestic Currency Deposits Level (DCL), which is related to Aviso 20/2012 de 25 
de Abril, the major regulation directed to the Oil sector. The latter variable helps to reflect the 
impact in the sense that this regulation made Oil companies to not only open Kwanzas accounts, 




The approach taken for building both models was the same and based in four main steps: 
1) Create a correlation matrix between every variable with the main purpose to identify 
the ones with a low absolute correlation factor to the dependent variables and cut some 
of the variables that do not contribute for the problem being studied. 
2) Before starting the model, it is necessary to test for stationarity in all the variables as 
they are time-series, using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root test and correct them 
for stationarity, so that a biased conclusion on the model’s significance is avoided. 
3) Construct a multi-factor regression model and obtain the one that maximizes the 
Adjusted 𝑅2. For this stage, a stepwise backwards approach was undertaken, starting by 
the full model and decreasing at each time the number of insignificant variables until an 
optimal level was reached. 
4) Finally, take conclusions on the statistical meaning of the findings based on the 
significance levels of each of the variables and their economic meaning. 
7.4.RSR Multi-factor Regression 
For this model, the sample considered ranged from September 2011 until September 2016 on a 
monthly basis, meaning an N= 60 observations. This sample size is explained by the fact that 
BFA only started to calculate its Regulated Solvency Ratio on a monthly basis in 2011 and that 
the calculation of RSR took a major improvement in September 2011. 
After proceeding with previously detailed approach, the final model obtained was the following 
(see Appendix I for the regression output):  
𝐷_𝑅𝑆𝑅𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽2. 𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽3. 𝐷𝐹𝐶𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝛽4. 𝐷_𝐸𝑋_𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5. 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽6 . 𝐷_𝐵𝑇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
𝐷_𝑅𝑆𝑅𝑡−1 : First Difference of Variable RSR with Lag 1. 
𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 : First Difference of Variable DD with Lag 1. 
𝐷_𝐹𝐶𝐿𝑡−1 : First Difference of Variable FCL with Lag 1. 
𝐷_𝐸𝑋_𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 : First Difference of Variable D_EX_SPREAD with Lag 1. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡: Variable INF 




(see Appendix Extra for the ADF output for each of the variables above tested) 
Taking a look at the Correlation Matrix between the variables at Step 1 (see Figure 13), one 
can see the low correlation factors that variables OIL and DCD have, which explains why they 
were not considered when running the model. Focusing on these two variables, it is seen that 
𝜌𝑂𝐼𝐿 =  −0.1193 and 𝜌𝐷𝐶𝐷 = 0.1825, being both lower than a Pearson coefficient of 0.2. 
Although 𝜌𝐷𝐷 = −0.1643, it was decided that it would remain in the analysis as it consists on 
one of the most important predictors to test. 
 
Figure 13  Correlation Matrix on RSR model 
After the final model was regressed, the only variables that were considered to be significant at 
a 10% significance level were the Deposit Dollarization with a negative relation with RSR, 
Loan Dollarization with a positive impact on the RSR and Foreign Currency Level a small, yet 
negative, impact on the RSR. However, it needs to be stated that the model’s quality is very 
poor, presenting an 𝑅2 = 0.1646, meaning that the set of these 6 predictors are only able to 
explain 16% of the RSR behaviour. Ultimately, this means that despite both the Dollarization 
Levels had a significant impact on the RSR, it only contributed for explaining a small fraction 
of the Regulated Solvency Ratio, which leads to the main conclusion that the overall impact of 
Dedollarization in this KPI is very small, if not null.  Nevertheless, analysing the different 




on the Deposits Dollarization Level) would lead to an increment in the Regulated Solvency 
Ratio: given that the bank’s solvency is seen as its ability to repay its debt obligations in the 
medium-long term, a decrease in the USD obligations (USD deposits) is a positive event for 
the bank, as it becomes more solid. This is explained by the fact that at the current state of the 
Angolan economy, BNA struggles a lot to provide USD to the economy, so if a bank’s 
obligations sheet is in Kwanzas, it will be a lot easier for BNA to support it.    
7.5.ROE Multi-factor Regression 
For this model, the sample considered ranged from 2007 until 2016 on a yearly basis, meaning 
a N= 9 observations. Though the size of sample was remarkably low, an attempt to stablish a 
relation between BFA’s Return on Equity and the change in the Dollarization levels was 
undertaken. The main reason for such initiative relies on the fact the component of profits and 
equity structure captured by ROE is the most important for the analysis of the bank’s situation. 
After proceeding with the previously detailed approach, the final model obtained was the 
following (see Appendix II for the regression output):  
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 . 𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝑡−2 + 𝛽2. 𝐷_𝐸𝑋_𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡−2 + 𝛽3. 𝐷_𝐹𝐶𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 : Variable ROE with Lag 1. 
𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝑡−2 : First Difference of Variable DD with Lag 2. 
𝐷_𝐸𝑋_𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡−2 : First Difference of Variable D_EX_SPREAD with Lag 1. 
𝐷_𝐹𝐶𝐿𝑡−1 : First Difference of Variable FCL with Lag 1. 
(see Appendix Extra for the ADF output for each of the variables above tested) 
Taking a look at the Correlation Matrix between the variables at Step 1 (see Figure 14), a 
different approach was followed due to the low number of observations for each variable. 
Therefore, the criteria to take variables out of the model dropped to all the correlation 
coefficients lower than 0.1. In this sense, variables INF and OIL were kept out of the model, 
with 𝜌𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 0.0072 and 𝜌𝑂𝐼𝐿 = 0.0922, respectively. Nevertheless, despite the fact that EX 
had a correlation coefficient > 0.1 ( 𝜌𝐸𝑋 = −0.1795 ), it was removed from the model due to 













Figure 14  Correlation Matrix on ROE model 
After the final model was regressed, only Deposits Dollarization and the Exchange Rate Spread 
were considered to be significant at a 10% significance level. Contrary to the previous model, 
this model presented a 𝑅2= 0.9511, a clear sign of significance and relevance of the two 
predictors. Taking into account the problem of sample size, this result only means that there 
might exist a positive impact on BFA’s ROE. Taking a look at Figure 15, which shows the 
spread in returns in both AKZ and USD deposits that BFA has to pay to their clients, only 
during the last year and half the return on USD deposits surpassed the Kwanza’s return. Thus, 
implying an average positive spread between DCD and FCD. Given that Deposits represent a 
liability for BFA, the higher the Dollarization Level, the lower will be the cost that BFA will 












As previously explained, a Dedollarization process is undertaken in order to restore monetary 
and fiscal policy autonomy. Usually, it means that the foreign currency is swapped by the local 
currency and re-gains use in most of its forms: store of value, means of payment and unit of 
account. Nevertheless, in the case of Angola there has been a successful transition from USD 
to Kwanzas in the forms of means of payment and unit of account. By recalling Figures 1 and 
2, it is easily seen how the impact of BNA’s prudential measures had a statement in bringing 
down the Dollarization Levels in both Deposits and Loans to levels close to 20% in only 5 
years. As Departamento de Estudos Económicos (2014) state in their article, until 2013 Angola 
was being very successful on Dedollarizing its economy, mainly due to the role of BNA, which, 
back in 2013, was able to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment and a working stimulus 
to take the USD out of the economy. Ultimately, the department was able to prove in their 
study, that Dedollarization and macroeconomic stability share an interdependent relation. 
However, fast-forwarding to 2016, it is seen that the process was not fully completed: inflation 
levels close to 40%, a never-ending Kwanza devaluation and yet, the banking system presents 
a balance-sheet with low levels of USD Assets and Liabilities. Additionally, the shock on oil 
prices brought high levels of inflation and an abrupt devaluation of Kwanza which made people 
to pursuit the USD, as it is known that on a recent dollarized economy, whenever there is an 
external shock, people tend to protect themselves with foreign currency. This event was critical 
in making the population of Angola very cautious regarding Kwanza as a form of store of value. 
Taking a look at Figure 16, the increasing values for Kwanza that are being exchanged in the 
Parallel Market are pushing the exchange rate to astonishing levels, showing the low level of 
credibility that Kwanza has close to the population. Moreover, this trend can be also seen by 
the fact that most of the Angolans are buying USD indexed Treasury Bill at a very large growth 




              Figure 16  Source: BFA and BNA                                            Figure 17  Source: BFA and BNA 
Concerning the effective impact that Dedollarization has on BFA, and despite the fact the 
statistical model approach did not provide a viable significant conclusion, there are several 
important remarks to be made, based on the current economic conditions. 
Firstly, Dedollarization for banks means better liquidity and solvency levels, which is aligned 
with the statistical findings of the RSR model. In the case of BFA’s Assets, the bank is in a 
better position when its assets are in national currency. Moreover, a Bank in Angola with Assets 
in USD has a high exposure level to several risks: credit risk, since it is not foreseeable that the 
client will be able to repay a loan in USD; and balance sheet risk, due to risk that a possible 
default from a client represents on a bank’s liabilities, i.e. deposits. 
Secondly, this process of Dedollarization brought an opportunity for banks to capitalize on the 
change of Loans from USD to Kwanza, as from 2011 onwards, the supply of loans in USD was 
blocked. By analysing Figures 16 and 17, it is obvious the spread that the Bank earns an excess 
for having the asset or liability in national currency than if it was in foreign currency. This fact 
is extremely important when understanding the impact of Dedollarization on BFA’s results, as 
it allowed BFA to take advantage of this rise of Kwanza’s interest rate, due to the high 
depreciation and inflation. 
Thirdly, the biggest advantage for an Angolan bank with a low level of USD balance-sheet is 
that the bank is easily helped by BNA during an emergency, as the foreign currency is very 




case of an unexpected event. 
Lastly, there is a last remark that deserves to be mentioned: the impact of Oil prices on the 
Banking system results and on the Dedollarization’s success path. Resorting to Figure 18, it 
can be immediately detected that when the crash on oil prices occurs, during the thirst trimester 
of 2014, there is an immediate jump on the percentage of clients that defaulted their payments 
on their obligations. This evidence is a statement of the huge impact that an exogenous shock 







            Figure 18  Source: BFA and Bloomberg                                                         Figure 19  Source: BNA 
However, the Banking system was not the only affected as this shock shook the Angolan 
economy from the bottom to the top, also affecting the Angolan budget and reserves. Taking a 
close look on Figure 19, it shows a very particular relationship between the Angola’s Current 
Account and the evolution of the Exchange rate. After the oil shock, which resulted in a negative 
current account in 2014, the Government had to rely on its international reserves in order to 
correct for the deficit, which increases the stock of national currency versus the stock of foreign 
currency. Thus, leading to an increase in the exchange rate, i.e. the Kwanza depreciates. With 
this analysis, it is obvious how the oil shock had a direct impact on the change of course in the 
Dedollarization process. In this sense, the Angolan GDP diversification must be viewed as a 
priority in order to avoid a similar situation in the future. 
Concluding, this project enabled the understanding of how the Dedollarization has a positive 




spread between the return on assets in National currency versus Foreign currency to remain at 
attractive levels. Continuing on the same logical path, it would be interesting from a statistical 
point of view to forecast the impact of continuing with a De-Dollarization process but with a 
low inflation environment, close to the levels prior 2014, as the Angolan economy is finally 
showing signs of starting to recover. 
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